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Abstract
In [19], the authors presented a type-theoretic approach to the verification of security protocols. In this
approach, a universal type system is proposed to capture in a finite way all the possible computations
(internal actions or protocol instrumentations) that could be performed by a smart malicious intruder. This
reduces the verification of cryptographic protocols to a typing problem where types are attack scenarios.
In this paper, we recall this type system and we prove its completeness i.e. if the intruder can learn a
message from a given protocol instrumentation, then this message could be infered from the type system.
A significant result of this paper is the presentation of a new transformation that allows us to abstract a
non-terminating type inference system into a terminating deductive proof system. We demonstrate how
these results could be used to establish the security of cryptographic protocols from the secrecy standpoint.
Finally, the usefulness and the efficiency of the whole approach is illustrated by proving the correctness of
a new version of the Needham-Shoreder protocol with respect to the secrecy property.
1 Motivations and Background
Information technology is becoming, more and more, a vitally important underpin-
ning of our economy and society. It is embedded in our everyday applications and
animates a wide class of systems that range from small to large, and from simple to
extremely complex. Actually, information systems increasingly govern nearly every
aspect of our lives. This omnipresence is largely increased by the dazzling expansion
of Internet, World Wide Web, parallel and distributed systems and mobile com-
putation. In such contexts, information must be protected against mystification,
destruction and disclosure. Accordingly, a great deal of interest has been expressed
in the development and use of cryptographic protocols.
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A protocol is an orderly defined sequence of communication and computation
steps. A communication step transfers messages from one principal (sender) to
another (receiver), while a computation step updates a principal’s internal state. A
protocol with a security objective is called a cryptographic protocol. Cryptographic
functions are used to achieve such an objective. In the literature, two major classes
of cryptographic protocols have been advanced: authentication protocols and key
distribution protocols. The primary objective of authentication protocols is to allow
principals to identify themselves to each other. Key distribution protocols aim to
distribute cryptographic keys between principals.
Today, it is well known that the design of cryptographic protocols is error prone.
Several protocols have been shown flawed in computer security literature [14] many
years after their publication and use. Moreover, the correctness of these protocols
is paramount, especially when we consider the size of the networks involved and
the desire of principals to put confidential information and to allow for financial
transactions to take place across the network.
The primary objective of this work is to build on top of the work proposed in
[19] to contribute to the correctness of security protocols. Actually, in [19], the
authors presented a type-theoretic approach to the verification of security protocols.
In this approach, a universal type system is proposed to capture in a finite way
all the possible computations (internal actions or protocol instrumentations) that
could be performed by a smart malicious intruder. This reduces the verification
of cryptographic protocols to a typing problem where types are attack scenarios.
In this paper, we recall this type system and we prove its completeness i.e. if
the intruder can learn a message from a given protocol instrumentation, then this
message could be infered from the type system. A significant result of this paper is
the presentation of a new transformation that allows us to abstract a non-terminating
type inference system into a terminating deductive proof system. We demonstrate
how these results could be used to establish the security of cryptographic protocols
from the secrecy standpoint. Finally, the usefulness and the efficiency of the whole
approach is illustrated by proving the correctness of a new version of the Needham-
Shoreder protocol with respect to the secrecy property.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present an overview
of related work in the area of modeling and verification of cryptographic protocols.
In Section 3, we review the basic notation and terminology used for cryptographic
protocols. In Section 4, we present the type system and the results related to its
correctness and completeness. In Section 5, we present a new schema allowing to
handle the termination problem within the type system. The efficiency on this
schema is illustrated on a concret example. Finally, in Section 6, some concluding
remarks are ultimately sketched as a conclusion.
2 Related Work
Formal modeling and verification of cryptographic protocols has received much at-
tention in recent years. Several frameworks for the description and analysis of cryp-
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tographic protocols have been proposed. A complete bibliography and a comparative
study of these methods can be found in [12,13,14,31,34,40,50,49] [55,56]. These meth-
ods could be classified as follows: logical methods, general purpose formal methods
and process algebra methods.
Typically, logical methods rest on the use of modal (epistemic, temporal and/or
doxatic) logics. The logic is used to specify the protocol (idealization) as well as the
security properties. In 1989, Burrows, Abadi and Needham devised BAN, a modal
logic of belief for the specification and verification of cryptographic protocols [10,11].
BAN is the most known and famous logic dedicated to cryptographic protocols.
Since then, plenty of derived logics have been advanced [3,23,27,28,39]. In 1990,
Bieber [4] developed CKT5, a modal logic of knowledge that has been revised and
extended by Carlsen in [13] and Snekkenes in [54]. Concurrently, many other logics
attempted to combine several aspects of modal logic such as belief, knowledge and
trust [26,46,47,58]. These methods have been successfully used to detect many flaws
in cryptographic protocols and they are very expressive while specifying security
properties. Nevertheless, they are not very suitable for specifying the protocols
themselves. In fact, the protocols are often translated into a set of logical formulas.
The translation process, often referred to as idealization, is error-prone since it
aims to translate an operational description into a logical one. Furthermore, the
idealization is not systematic. Moreover, most of the proposed logics, while proved
sound with respect to some semantics are generally incomplete. In addition, the
verification of the protocol is always manual and semi-formal.
Another trend in formal cryptographic development is to make use of some well-
known general purpose formal methods. Representative specification languages that
have been used include LOTOS [9,60,61,62], B, VDM [5,6,59], HOL [54], Ina Jo
[32,33], Z [8,53] and Coq [7]. Although these formal methods are now firmly es-
tablished and known to be of great use in specification and verification, it remains
that these methods are not dedicated to cryptographic protocols. In addition, these
methods need much expert assistance during the verification process. In fact, they
rely on manual or interactive theorem proving techniques.
Recently, the use of process algebra for cryptographic protocol specification and
verification has been explored. In 1995, Gavin Lowe [35,36,37,38] was the first to use
CSP [29] and model-checking techniques for cryptographic protocol analysis. The
protocol is specified as a set of communicating sequential processes that are running
in parallel and interacting with their surroundings. The verification is performed
by extracting a model (usually a finite state transition system) from the specifica-
tion and checking that model against a logical specification (a formula over a modal
temporal logic) or a behavioral specification (a process term). A similar approach
was developed by Bill Roscoe, Paul Gardiner, Dave Jackson and Janson Hulance in
[24,25,48] and Steve Schneider in [51]. In [44,45,52] Mitchell et al. analyzed cryp-
tographic protocols using the general-purpose state enumeration tool Murφ [15].
Abadi and Gordon [1,2] advanced Spi, a calculus for cryptographic protocols. Spi
is built on top of the pi-calculus [41,42,43], a mobile process algebra. It has been
devised for the description and analysis of security protocols. Many other approachs
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[30,50,57] are based on the Dolev-Yao model [22] that consider protocols from an
attacker’s standpoint. The process algebra-based methods have been successfully
used to detect several flaws in well-known cryptographic protocols. The approach
seems to be very promising and useful. However, it is well known that the under-
lying verification techniques, mainly those based on model-checking, are generally
problematic in the presence of processes that exhibit infinite behaviors. Accordingly,
the infinite aspects of cryptographic protocols are usually not supported in the veri-
fication process. Notice also that the specification of security properties in terms of
process agents or modal formulae is neither straightforward nor systematic (except
in the case of Spi).
3 Basics
In this section, we introduce the basic notations that will be used throughout this
paper. This protocol notation, which we refer to as the standard notation, is based
on a fairly standard informal notation used by the security protocol community.
The statement A → B : m denotes the transmission of a message m from the
principal A to the principal B. A message is composed of one or more primitive
words. A message m encrypted with key k is written {m}k and forms a word by
itself. Concatenated messages are separated by commas. Message contents (words)
have the following naming conventions: Encryption keys and nonces are respectively
written k and N . Principals are written A, B, S and I, where A and B stand for
principals who wish to communicate, S for a trusted server and I for a potential
intruder. Subscripts will be used to denote an association to a principal; thus, for
example Na is a nonce that belongs to A and kas is a shared key between A and S.
Here is the BNF syntax of messages:
m ::= A Principal Identifier
| Na Nonce
| k Key
| n Numeral
| X Message Variable
| {m}k Encrypted Message
| m,m′ Message Concatenation
| m op m′ Arithmetic Operation
where op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /}.
A message m is said to be atomic if it is a principal identity, a nonce, a key, or a
numeral. As an example, we show in Table 1 the Needham Schroeder protocol with
symmetric keys. This protocol achieves both authentication and key distribution
between two principals A and B by the means of a trusted server S.
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1. A → S : A,B,Na
2. S → A : {Na, B, kab, {kab, A}kbs}kas
3. A → B : {kab, A}kbs
4. B → A : {Nb}kab
5. A → B : {Nb − 1}kab
Table 1
The Needham Schroeder Protocol with Conventional Keys
Here Na and Nb are nonces, i.e.random numbers generated respectively by A and
B especially for this protocol run. S is a server and kas and kbs are keys that A and
B initially share with S. The key kab is a fresh key dynamically generated by the
server S, for use by the principals A and B. The description of the protocol can be
read as follows: First, A initiates the protocol and claims to the server S its desire
to authenticate and communicate with B by sending the message A,B,Na. Second,
the server S generates a fresh key kab and sends it back to A wrapped in the message
{Na, B, kab, {kab, A}kbs}kas . Third, the principal A decrypts the previous message,
extracts the component {kab, A}kbs and sends it back to B. Fourth, receiving the
previous message, the principal B decrypts it and extracts the key kab that it uses
to encrypt a fresh nonce Nb to get {Nb}kab , which it sends to A. Finally, A extracts
the nonce Nb, decrements it by 1, and sends the result back to B encrypted by the
key kab, thus proving A’s identity to B.
4 Type System
The main idea underlying the type system is to come up with a universal model
that captures in a finite way all the intruder abilities. In addition, the intruder
is made powerful, smart and lazy. By powerful, we mean that the intruder has a
complete control over the network. By smart, we mean that the intruder knows
which messages he needs to break a security property. By lazy, we mean that the
intruder will act in a goal-directed manner. He will neither generate nor send any
message that is not useful to achieve an attack. Furthermore, the intruder is able
to:
• overhear every message and decrypt cyphertext when he has the appropriate key,
• intercept and store messages,
• generate new messages using his initial knowledge and the intercepted messages.
The intruder abilities are formally captured as a type system in which protocols
are represented as static environments, messages as programs and attack scenarios
as types. The type system captures an insecurity property. When a message is
provable under the typing rules this means that the intruder could get that message
by combining its traditional abilities together with protocol instrumentations.
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Fig. 1. Approach Outline
As shown by Fig. 1, the type system aims to transform the problem of the
cryptographic protocol analysis to a typing problem.
4.1 Protocols, Roles and Environments
In this sequel, we explain how to generate a role-based specification from protocol
descriptions written in the standard notation. These specifications will be used
to provide static environments for the type system. These specifications were first
introduced in [16,17,18] for the purpose of verification of authentication protocols.
First, we review the definition of a role and a generalized role, in order to introduce
the notion of a static environment. We will illustrate this concept on the Needham
Schroeder Protocol.
4.1.1 Role
A role is a protocol abstraction where the emphasis is put on a particular principal.
More precisely, roles are extracted from the protocol according to the following steps:
• For each principal, we extract all the steps in the protocol in which it participates.
Furthermore, we add the same session identifier i to all those steps. Finally, to
each fresh message we add i as exponent to indicate the fact that those messages
change their values from one execution of the protocol to another.
• We introduce explicitly an intruder I to indicate that all the messages sent or
received by the principal of the role have to be sent or received to/from the
intruder.
For instance, in the case of the Needham Schroeder protocol of Table 1, three roles
can be extracted, A, B and S. They respectively correspond to principals playing
the roles A, B and S. Note that throughout the rest of this paper the terms “role”
and “principal” will be used interchangeably, whenever the meaning is unambiguous.
For example, in the following, “S” should be understood as “a principal playing the
role of S”, and similarly for A and B.
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The first step of the role generation gives the following:
A = 〈i.1, A→ S : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, S → A : {N ia, B, k
i
ab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas〉
〈i.3, A→ B : {kiab, A}kbs〉
〈i.4, B → A : {N ib}kiab
〉
〈i.5, A→ B : {N ib − 1}kiab
〉
S = 〈i.1, A → S : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, S → A : {N ia, B, k
i
ab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas〉
B = 〈i.3, A → B : {kiab, A}kbs〉
〈i.4, B → A : {N ib}kiab
〉
〈i.5, A → B : {N ib − 1}kiab
〉
After the second step, the following results are obtained. Here I(S) indicates the
intruder acting in the role of S, etc.
A = 〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, I(S) → A : {N ia, B, k
i
ab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas〉
〈i.3, A→ I(B) : {kiab, A}kbs〉
〈i.4, I(B) → A : {N ib}kiab
〉
〈i.5, A→ I(B) : {N ib − 1}kiab
〉
S = 〈i.1, I(A) → S : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, S → I(A) : {N ia, B, k
i
ab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas〉
B = 〈i.3, I(A) → B : {kiab, A}kbs〉
〈i.4, B → I(A) : {N ib}kiab
〉
〈i.5, I(A) → B : {N ib − 1}kiab
〉
4.1.2 Generalized Roles
From the roles, we extract what we call generalized roles. A generalized role is an
abstraction of a role where some messages are replaced by variables. Intuitively, we
replace a message or a component of message by a variable, if the receiver of this
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message could not do any verification on it. Generalized roles give a precise idea
about the principals’ behaviours during the protocol execution.
For instance, the principal, playing the role A, participates in the protocol
through these 5 steps:
(i) The principal A initiates the protocol by sending the message A,B,N ia to the
principal S.
(ii) The principal A receives the message
{N ia, B, kab, {kab, A}kbs}kas
from S. Actually, A receives a message of the form {N ia, B,X, Y }kas where
X and Y are message variables. Here, we replace the message kab by X and
{kab, A}kbs by Y . The rationale underlying such substitutions is that the prin-
cipal A is waiting for a message (kab, A) encrypted under a key (kbs) that is not
known to A. The principal A has no means to check either that the received
message at the second step is actually encrypted under kbs, or that its content
is “kab, A”. Hence, A can accept any message, say Y , at this second step. A
similar argument applies to the substitution of kab by X.
(iii) The principal A reacts according to the protocol by sending the message Y to
B.
(iv) The principal A receives the message {N ib}kab and is supposed to react by
sending {N ib − 1}kab . However, notice that: (i) The principal A has no prior
knowledge about the value of the expected nonce, so A has no means to verify
the value of the received message at that step; (ii) The freshness of N ib is a
local property. In other words, the freshness of the nonce cannot be attested by
any principal other than B. So, A cannot require the freshness of the received
message; (iii) For the sake of generality, we assume that the exchanged messages
are not typed. Consequently, A is unable to verify the type of the message
received at the fourth step of the protocol. Owing to these three facts, A can
verify neither the value, the freshness nor the type of the message received at
the fourth step of the protocol. Accordingly, N ib will be replaced by Z.
(v) Finally, A sends the message {Z − 1}X to B.
In summary, the role associated with A, for a session i, can be written as the
following sequence of actions:
A = 〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, I(S) → A : {N ia, B,X, Y }kas〉
〈i.3, A→ I(B) : Y 〉
〈i.4, I(B) → A : {Z}X〉
〈i.5, A→ I(B) : {Z − 1}X〉
More formally, a generalized role could be introduced as follows. Let A, be the
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role of A, KA the initial knowledge of the principal A (for the sake of simplicity,
we suppose that KA contains only atomic messages) and M
A the set of messages
exchanged in the role A. We define the component of MA that is unknown to A,
denoted by MA→KA
, using the following rewriting rules:
M ∪ {m} →K∪{m} M
M ∪ {{m}k} →K∪{k} M ∪ {m}
M ∪ {{m}k} ∪ {k} →K M ∪ {m} ∪ {k}
M ∪ {m.m′} →K M ∪ {m} ∪ {m
′}
M ∪ {m op m′} →K M ∪ {m} ∪ {m
′}
Now let f be any injective function from MA→KA
to the set of message variables.
The generalized role of A, is obtained from A by replacing each exchanged message
m by Gf (m), where Gf (m) is defined as follows:
Gf (m) = f(m) If f(m) is defined
Gf (m) = m If m is atomic and
f(m) is not defined
Gf (m.m
′) = Gf (m).Gf (m
′)
Gf (m op m
′) = Gf (m) op Gf (m
′)
Gf ({m}k) = {Gf (m)}Gf (k)Iff({m}k)
is not defined
Notice that for the sake of simplicity, we deal only with symmetric key protocols
and the results could be easily extended to others kind of protocols.
For the role S, we have:
MS = {A.B.N ia, {N
i
a, B, k
i
ab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas}
Let KS = {A,B, S, kas, kbs, k
i
ab} be the initial knowledge of S, therefore:
MS→KS
= {N ia}
Now, let f be the injective function from MS→KS
to the set of message variables
defined as follows:
f(N ia) = X
Since:
Gf (A.B.N
i
a) = A.B.X
and
Gf ({N
i
a, B, k
i
ab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas) =
{X,B, kiab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas
We conclude that the generalized role of S is:
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S = 〈i.1, I(A) → S : A,B,X〉
〈i.2, S → I(A) : {X,B, kiab,
{kiab, A}kbs}kas〉
Similarly, the generalized roles associated with B could be written as follows:
B = 〈i.3, I(A) → B : {X,A}kbs 〉
〈i.4, B → I(A) : {N ib}X〉
〈i.5, I(A) → B : {N ib − 1}X〉
4.1.3 Environment
We are interested in role instrumentation by an active, malicious intruder. The idea
is to supply a given role with the messages it expects, in order to get the role to
produce a particular message that will be used in an attack. Hence, we are interested
in the output communication steps of the roles. We split each role into many sub-
roles, each of which ends with an output communication step. In the case of the
principal A, we have three outputs. Accordingly, we will split A into three sub-roles
A1, A2 and A3. Thus, we get the following:
A1 = 〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N ia〉
A2 = 〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, I(S) → A : {N ia, B,X, Y }kas〉
〈i.3, A→ I(B) : Y 〉
A3 = 〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, I(S) → A : {N ia, B,X, Y }kas〉
〈i.3, A→ I(B) : Y 〉
〈i.4, I(B) → A : {Z}X〉
〈i.5, A→ I(B) : {Z − 1}X 〉
In the case of the principals S and B, we have only one output communication
step. Consequently, we will have S1 and B1 defined as follows:
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S1 = 〈i.1, I(A) → S : A,B,X〉
〈i.2, S → I(A) : {X,B, kiab,
{kiab, A}kbs}kas〉
B1 = 〈i.3, I(A) → B : {X,A}kbs〉
〈i.4, B → I(A) : {N ib}X〉
Each sub-role ends with an output communication step. The last step of the
protocol, i.e:
〈i.5, I(A) → B : {N ib − 1}X 〉
is then removed from B1. This is motivated by the fact that this step is not needed
to get the message {N ib}X from B.
Now we are ready to introduce the notion of static environment. This is simply
a mapping that takes a multiset containing the last messages output by a given
sub-role to the sequence of communication steps representing this sub-role. We will
see later why the notion of a multiset is useful. An empty sequence of communica-
tion steps corresponds to the multiset containing the intruder’s initial knowledge. A
multiset will be written between the following curly brackets {| . . . |} (to avoid ambi-
guity, two concatenated messages m1,m2 used in a set or a multiset will be denoted
by m1.m2). If M is a multiset, then we use M to denote the set containing all the
messages in M . An empty sequence of communication steps is denoted by . As an
illustration, the static environment associated with the Needham Schroeder protocol
of Table 1 is shown in Table 2. The multiset KI contains messages initially known
by the intruder. Notice that these roles and the corresponding environments can
be generated automatically from the protocol descriptions written in the standard
notation. The underlying algorithms are detailed in [16,17,18].
In the remainder of this paper, we use the following notation: IfA is a generalized
role, then A∗ will denote the following set:
A∗ =
⋃
σ∈Γ
{Aσ}
where Γ is the set of all possible substitutions. Also, if A1 . . .An1 , B1 . . .Bn2 , . . . are
the generalized roles associated with a given protocol P , then P∗ is the following
set:
P∗ = A∗1 ∪ . . . ∪ A
∗
n1 ∪ B
∗
1 ∪ . . . ∪ B
∗
n2 . . .
If ξ is a static environment, we will use the notation ξ∗ to denote the following
set:
ξ∗ =
⋃
σ∈Γ
⋃
A∈Rng(ξ)
{Aσ}
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ξ = {
KI 7→ 
{|A.B.N ia|} 7→ 〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N
i
a〉
{|Y |} 7→
〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, I(S) → A : {N ia, B,X, Y }kas〉
〈i.3, A→ I(B) : Y 〉
{|{Z − 1}X |} 7→
〈i.1, A→ I(S) : A,B,N ia〉
〈i.2, I(S) → A : {N ia, B,X, Y }kas〉
〈i.3, A→ I(B) : Y 〉
〈i.4, I(B) → A : {Z}X〉
〈i.5, A→ I(B) : {Z − 1}X 〉
{|{X,B, kiab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas |} 7→
〈i.1, I(A) → S : A,B,X〉
〈i.2, S → I(A) : {X,B, kiab, {k
i
ab, A}kbs}kas〉
{|{N ib}X |} 7→
〈i.3, I(A) → B : {X,A}kbs 〉
〈i.4, B → I(A) : {N ib}X〉
}
Table 2
The Needham Schroeder Environment
4.2 Scenario
Our typing rules will make use of the notion of a scenario, which we formalize here.
Given a static environment ξ, we associate a scenario τ (a type) to a message m
(a program). This means that the message m could be inferred by the intruder
by following the scenario τ in which the intruder uses some of its usual abilities
and some instrumentations of the protocol ξ. Intuitively, a scenario is a valid trace
denoting a protocol execution, i.e., a sequence of communication steps in which
principals act according to the protocol specification and all the messages sent by
the intruder are derivable from its knowledge.
A message m is said to be derivable by the intruder from its knowledge, say M
(a message set), whenever m can be obtained from M by using the intruder’s con-
ventional abilities (encryption, decryption, composition, and decomposition). More
formally, we say that m is derivable from M if m ∈M⇓, where M⇓ is the closure of
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the message set M under the conventional operations. Here is the formal definition:
Definition 4.1 [Closure] Let M be a message set. We denote by M⇓ the closure of
the set M under the conventional intruder computations. The closure M⇓ is defined
as the least set satisfying the following conditions:
(i) M ⊆M⇓,
(ii) (k ∈M⇓) ∧ ({m}k ∈M⇓) ⇒ m ∈M⇓,
(iii) (m ∈M⇓) ∧ (m
′ ∈M⇓) ⇒ m op m
′ ∈M⇓
(iv) (m op m′ ∈M⇓) ∧ (m
′ ∈M⇓) ⇒ m ∈M⇓,
(v) (m op m′ ∈M⇓) ∧ (m ∈M⇓) ⇒ m
′ ∈M⇓,
(vi) (k ∈M⇓) ∧ (m ∈M⇓) ⇒ {m}k ∈M⇓,
(vii) (m ∈M⇓) ∧ (m
′ ∈M⇓) ⇒ m.m
′ ∈M⇓,
(viii) (m.m′ ∈M⇓) ⇒ {m,m
′} ⊆M⇓.
where op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /},
Now, we need to define the algebra T of types. The structure of T is given by
the following BNF grammar:
τ ::= 
| 〈i.j, I(A) → B : m〉.τ
| 〈i.j, A → I(B) : m〉.τ
where the type 〈i.j, I(A) → B : m〉.τ stands for the sequence in which the intruder
starts by an usurpation of the principal A and then sends the message m to the
principal B. The rest of the sequence is τ . The type 〈i.j, A→ I(B) : m〉.τ stands
for the sequence whose first step is a combination of an usurpation of the principal
B by the intruder together with an interception of the message m. The rest of the
sequence is τ . The term i.j denotes the identifier of the session i and the number of
the communication step j according to the protocol description.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we denote by Ci,j the set of all possible com-
munication steps labeled with i.j. We write ci,j to denote a communication step in
Ci,j and label(c) to denote the label of the communication step c. Also, we use the
notation C, Ci, C
A and CAi to denotes the following sets:
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C =
⋃
i,j Ci,j
Ci =
⋃
j Ci,j
CA = {c ∈ C | c = 〈i.j, I(B) → A : m〉 or
c = 〈i.j, A→ I(B) : m〉}
CAi = C
A ∩ Ci
CAij = C
A ∩ Cij
To lighten the notation, we will omit the sequence concatenation operator “.”
and the trivial type  when the meaning is unambiguous.
Although the intuitive meaning of a valid trace seems to be clear at first glance,
we define the notion more precisely here. In what follows, we will introduce a set of
conditions on traces of communication steps that characterizes valid scenarios.
The most important condition that has to be satisfied by a valid trace is a data-
flow constraint. Such a constraint is inspired by dataflow analysis which stipulates
that a variable should be defined before its use. Analogously, in a cryptographic
protocol setting, we require that a message should be defined (i.e.in the initial
knowledge, previously received, or deducible by a closure) before its use (sending
over the network). For that, we need to introduce the following Def/Use definitions:
Definition 4.2 [Def/Use] Let τ be a type and ki a message set denoting the intruder
initial knowledge. We define the operations Def and Use as follows:
• The set Defki(τ) stands for the messages received by the intruder in the commu-
nication steps reported in the type τ together with its initial knowledge. It is
inductively defined as follows:
Defki() = ki
Defki(〈i.j, A→ I(B) : m〉.τ) = {m} ∪ Defki(τ)
Defki(〈i.j, I(A) → B : m〉.τ) = Defki(τ)
• The set Use(τ) stands for the set of messages sent by the intruder in the commu-
nication steps reported in the type τ . This set is inductively defined as follows:
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Use() = ∅
Use(〈i.j, A→ I(B) : m〉.τ) = Use(τ)
Use(〈i.j, I(A) → B : m〉.τ) = {m} ∪ Use(τ)
Throughout all this paper and when there is no ambiguity, Defki(τ) will be merely
written Def(τ). We need to introduce the multiset extension Use of Use and Def
of Def as follows:
Use() = ∅
Use(〈i.j, A → I(B) : m〉.τ) = Use(τ)
Use(〈i.j, I(A) → B : m〉.τ) = {|m|} ∪ Use(τ)
Defki() = ki
Defki(〈i.j, A → I(B) : m〉.τ) = {|m|} ∪ Defki(τ)
Defki(〈i.j, I(A) → B : m〉.τ) = Defki(τ)
Now, we are able to formalize the condition that captures the dataflow constraint.
This condition states that at each communication step c in a trace τ , the messages
used by the intruder have to be previously defined, i.e.they could be derived form
its initial knowledge and the messages received before this step.
Definition 4.3 [Well-Defined Type] A type τ is well-defined if, for each communi-
cation step c, with type τ1 and type τ2 such that τ = τ1.c.τ2, we have:
Use(c) ⊆ Def(τ1)⇓.
The second important condition that has to be satisfied by a valid trace is an
ordering relation between the communication steps used in a valid trace. This
condition states that the communication steps used in a valid trace have to follow
the order established by the protocol specification. For example, in the same session
i, the communication step ci,2 cannot occur before the communication step ci,1.
Furthermore, a valid trace should not contain duplicated communication steps. To
formalize such an ordering condition, we need to introduce the definition of the so-
called flattening operation. This operation takes a type to the set of communication
steps that form it. The flattening is defined as follows:
Definition 4.4 [Flattening] Let τ be a type. We define the flattening of τ , written
τ , as follows:
 = ∅
c.τ = {c} ∪ τ
where c is a communication step in C.
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Next we introduce a precedence order between communication steps in a given
type.
Definition 4.5 [≺τ ] Let τ ∈ T , and c and c
′ be two communication steps such that
{c, c′} ⊆ τ . We say that c precedes c′ in τ , and we write c ≺τ c
′, if there exist two
types τ1 and τ2 in T such that τ = τ1.τ2, {c
′} ∩ τ1 = ∅ and {c} ∩ τ2 = ∅.
Types that respect the ordering relation will be called well-ordered types. They
are formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.6 [Well-Ordered Type] We say that a type τ ∈ T is a well-ordered
type if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) For each session identifier i and for each natural number j, there exists at most
one communication step in τ labeled with i.j. In other words, if there exist
three types τ1, τ2 and τ3 and two communication steps c1 and c2 such that τ =
τ1.c1.τ2.c2.τ3, then label(c1) 6= label(c2),
(ii) If there exist two communication steps ci,j and ci,j′ , and a role identifier A such
that {ci,j, ci,j′} ⊆ τ ∩ C
A
i and j < j
′, then ci,j ≺τ ci,j′ .
It is straightforward to see that the two previous constraints (well-defined and
well-ordered) do not guarantee that the honest principals will act according to the
protocol specification. For that reason, we need another condition to complete the
characterization of a valid trace. Given some trace, to verify whether principals
have acted with respect to the protocol specification or not, we need to compare
the behaviors of these principals with their generalized roles. Each session in the
scenario has to correspond to an instantiation of some generalized role from a static
environment ξ. This is captured by the notion of ξ-induced types introduced here-
after.
Let S be a set of communication steps. We say that S is ξ-induced if all its
communication steps that belong to the same session are generated from a certain
role in the protocol specification ξ. More formally:
Definition 4.7 [ξ-Induced Set] Let ξ be a static environment denoting a protocol
specification and S a set of communication steps. We say that S is ξ-induced if for
each session identifier i and role identifier A such that S ∩ CAi 6= ∅, there exists τ in
ξ∗ such that τ = S ∩ CAi .
Notice that we say that a type τ is ξ-induced if τ is a ξ-induced set.
To sum up, we have now 3 constraints: First, the Def/Use condition ensures
that all the messages sent by the intruder can be derived from its initial knowledge
and the received messages. Second, the well-ordered type condition ensures that
the communication steps are well-ordered with respect to a given session. Third,
the ξ-induced type condition ensures that the honest principals act according to
the protocol specification. Now, we define a valid trace with respect to a static
environment ξ (also called a ξ-scenario), as follows:
Definition 4.8 [ξ-Scenario] Let τ be a type and ξ a static environment denoting a
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protocol specification. We say that τ is a ξ-scenario if:
(i) τ is a well-ordered type.
(ii) τ is a well-defined type.
(iii) τ is a ξ-induced type.
4.3 Typing Rules
In the sequel, we present a type system that propagates sequences of communication
steps in order to construct the sequence needed by the intruder to compute a given
message. The type system gives a type to a multiset of messages with respect to
an environment generated according to the protocol specification. The notion of
multiset is introduced to allow the extraction of a wide variety of protocol flaws. In
particular, this notation allows us to extract flaws that contain two different types
for the same message. To illustrate this, let us take a concrete example. Suppose
that we have a static environment that contains the following association:
{|m|} 7→
〈i.1, I(B) → A : m1〉
〈i.2, A→ I(B) : m2〉
〈i.3, I(B) → A : m1〉
〈i.4, A→ I(B) : m3〉
〈i.5, I(B) → A : m4〉
〈i.6, A→ I(B) : m〉
The association above means that the intruder has to derive the messages m1
and m4 to get the message m. A type of the message m reflects the scenario that
leads the intruder to the message m. Such a type must also contain the types of the
messages m1 and m4. In the example above, what makes the use of the multiset
notation more beneficial than the set notation is the multiple presence of the message
m1. Suppose that we use a simple set and we say that the intruder must infer a type
for the set of messages {m1,m4} to obtain the message m. In this case, the intruder
needs types for the messages m1 and m4. Furthermore, the type of the message m1
will be used twice since this message is needed in two places. Then, the scenario
will have the following form:
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Type of message m1
〈i.1, I(B) → A : m1〉
〈i.2, A→ I(B) : m2〉
〈i.3, I(B) → A : m1〉
〈i.4, A→ I(B) : m3〉
Type of message m4
〈i.5, I(B) → A : m4〉
〈i.6, A→ I(B) : m〉
However, if we use the multiset, we can say that the intruder has to prove the
following multiset of messages
{|m1,m1,m4|}
and in this case we have to prove the message m1 twice, as well as the message
m4. Suppose that there are many types that could be associated to the message
m1. Then, we can obtain a scenario in which we associate two different types to the
message m1, as shown below.
Type 1 of message m1
〈i.1, I(B) → A : m1〉
〈i.2, A→ I(B) : m2〉
Type 2 of message m1
〈i.3, I(B) → A : m1〉
〈i.4, A→ I(B) : m3〉
Type of message m4
〈i.5, I(B) → A : m4〉
〈i.6, A→ I(B) : m〉
Thus, with a multiset notation, we are no longer confined to have the same types
at the two occurrences where types for m1 are needed.
Our static semantics manipulates judgments of the form:
ξ `M : τ
meaning that the message multiset M has the type τ in the environment ξ. In other
words, the intruder could get all the messages in M by executing the sequence τ of
communication steps which may instrument the protocol ξ.
Before we introduce the typing rules, we need a way to merge the types of two
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(Triv) 2
ξ ` {||} : 
(Op1)
ξ ` {|m|} : τ1 ξ ` {|m
′|} : τ2 op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /} τ1]ξτ2
ξ ` {|m op m′|} : τ1 † τ2
(Op2)
ξ ` {|m|} : τ1 ξ ` {|m op m
′|} : τ2 op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /} τ1]ξτ2
ξ ` {|m′|} : τ1 † τ2
(Op3)
ξ ` {|m′|} : τ1 ξ ` {|m op m
′|} : τ2 op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /} τ1]ξτ2
ξ ` {|m|} : τ1 † τ2
(Comp)
ξ ` {|m|} : τ1 ξ ` {|m
′|} : τ2 τ1]ξτ2
ξ ` {|m.m′|} : τ1 † τ2
(Dec1)
ξ ` {|m.m′|} : τ
ξ ` {|m|} : τ
(Dec2)
ξ ` {|m.m′|} : τ
ξ ` {|m′|} : τ
(Encr)
ξ ` {|m|} : τ1 ξ ` {|k|} : τ2 τ1]ξτ2
ξ ` {|{m}k|} : τ1 † τ2
(Decr)
ξ ` {|{m}k|} : τ1 ξ ` {|k|} : τ2 τ1]ξτ2
ξ ` {|m|} : τ1 † τ2
(Inst)
ξ † [M 7→ τ1] ` Use(τ1σ) : τ2 M1 ⊆Mσ τ1σ]ξτ2
ξ † [M 7→ τ1] ` M1 : τ2 † τ1σ
(Cup)
ξ ` M1 : τ1 ξ ` M2 : τ2 τ1]ξτ2
ξ ` M1 ∪M2 : τ1 † τ2
(Equiv)
ξ ` M : τ1 τ1 ≈ τ2
ξ ` M : τ2
Table 3
The Typing Rules
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multisets of messages into one multiset, and to check for compatible types. Suppose
for example that we want to merge the following two types:
type 1 =


. . .
〈i.1, I(A) → B : m1〉
. . .
type 2 =


. . .
〈i.1, I(A) → B : m2〉
. . .
Suppose also that m1 and m2 are different messages. It is straightforward that
these two types cannot be merged since we have two different communication steps
having the same label.
The compatibility notion is more complicated than to simply guarantee that
there is no more than one communication step having the same label. In fact, we
must also ensure that each principal will not play more than one role in the same
session. Let us take a concrete example to explain this fact clearly. Suppose that
we have the following protocol:
〈i.1, A→ S : {A,B, k}kas〉
〈i.2, S → B : {B,A, k}kbs〉
Suppose also that we have the following two scenarios:
type 1 =


. . .
〈i.1, C → I(S) : {C,D, k}kcs〉
. . .
type 2 =


. . .
〈i.2, I(S) → C : {C,D, k}kcs〉
. . .
Those two scenarios could not be combined. In fact, in the first scenario, the
principal C plays the role of A in the session i. However, in the second scenario, the
principal C plays the role of B in the session i. Then, if we put together these two
scenarios, we will obtain a type that contains the same honest principal playing two
different roles in the same session. To avoid this situation, we require that the set of
communication steps used in the two merged scenarios form a ξ-induced set. Now,
we give the following definition that stipulates whether two types are compatible or
not.
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Definition 4.9 [Compatible Set] Let S be a set of communication steps. We say
that S is compatible with respect to an environment ξ, if the two following conditions
hold:
(i) S is a ξ-induced set.
(ii) For each session label i and each step label j, we have |Cij ∩ S| ≤ 1.
Suppose that τ1 and τ2 are two types and ξ is an environment. We say that τ1
and τ2 are compatible in ξ, and we write τ1]ξτ2, if the set τ1 ∪ τ2 is compatible in ξ.
Finally, if τ]ξτ , we say that τ is a self-compatible type in ξ.
Now, if we have two compatible scenarios τ1 and τ2, then the type τ1.τ2 is well-
defined and ξ-induced. Therefore, it remains only to check that the type τ1.τ2 forms
a well-ordered type to guarantee that the two concatenated types form a scenario.
For that reason, we need a definition of type merging that specifies how two types
will be gathered in order to ensure that the merge of two compatible scenarios gives
another scenario. Actually, the merge of two types τ1 and τ2 is a sort of type
concatenation that eliminates the redundant steps in τ2 with respect to the type τ1.
Definition 4.10 [Type Merge] Let τ1 and τ2 be two types and c a communication
step. The merge of τ1 and τ2, denoted by τ1 † τ2, is defined as follows:
τ †  = τ
τ † c.τ ′ = τ † τ ′ if c ∈ τ
τ † c.τ ′ = τ.c † τ ′ if c /∈ τ
Actually, there are many ways to merge subproofs in order to construct the global
attack scenario. Suppose that τ1 is a type of m1 and τ2 a type of m2. Suppose also
that τ1 and τ2 are two compatible types. Therefore, we can easily prove that τ1 † τ2
and τ2 † τ1 are two scenarios for the message m1.m2. Obviously, τ1 † τ2 could be
different from τ2†τ1. Consequently, in order to allow the inference of many equivalent
communication sequences, we need to introduce the following equivalence on types.
Definition 4.11 [Equivalence] Let τ and τ ′ be two well-ordered and well-formed
types. We say that τ is equivalent to τ ′ and we write τ ≈ τ ′ if τ = τ ′.
Let T1 be a subset of T . In the sequel, we use the notation T
≈
1 to denote the
following set:
T ≈1 = {τ ∈ T | ∃ τ1 ∈ T1 and τ ≈ τ1}
The typing rules are given in Table 3. The intuitive ideas underlying each rule
are as follows:
Triv: According to this rule, the empty communication step sequence, , is the type
of the empty multiset, {||}.
Op1: If τ1 is a type for the multiset {|m|}, τ2 is a type for the multiset {|m
′|} and
τ1 and τ2 are two compatible types, then τ1 † τ2 is a type for {|m op m
′|}, where
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op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /}. Since many cryptographic protocols use arithmetic operations,
like
〈i.1, A→ B : {Nb + 1}kab〉,
we have introduced the set of operators {+,−, ∗, /} to deal with a large class
of protocols. The rules Op1, Op2 and Op3 show how to cope with messages
containing an operator in {+,−, ∗, /}. There is no evaluation of messages that
contain operators. For example, the message m ∗ 0 is treated differently from the
message 0.
Comp: This is a composition rule and it illustrates how to give a type to a message
of the form m.m′ knowing the types of the messages m and m′. Accordingly, if τ1
is a type for the multiset {|m|}, τ2 is a type for the multiset {|m
′|} and τ1, τ2 are
two compatible types, then the merged type τ1†τ2 is a type for {|m.m
′|}. Similarly,
the rules Dec1 and Dec2 are decomposition rules. They stipulate that a type
τ for the message multiset {|m.m′|} is also a type for the one-message multisets
{|m|} and {|m′|}.
Encr: This rule stipulates that if τ1 is a type of the message m and τ2 is the type
of the key k such that τ1 and τ2 are two compatible types, then τ1 † τ2 is a type
of the message {m}k. The decryption rule Decr shows that the type τ1 † τ2 could
be a type of the message m, if τ1 is a type for a message {m}k, τ2 is a type for
the key k and τ1 and τ2 are two compatible types.
Inst: The rules Op1, Op2, Op3, Comp, Dec1, Dec2, Encr and Decr represent
the intruder’s usual abilities. However, the rule instantiation, Inst, gives a sup-
plementary ability to the intruder based on the instrumentation of the protocol
itself. The rule Inst is the most important rule in the type system. In fact, all the
usual rules can merge only the types that are basically generated by the rule Inst.
The intuition underlying the instantiation rule can be explained by the following
example. Suppose that we have a static environment ξ that contains the following
association:
{|{X}kas |} 7→
〈i.1, A→ I(B) : A〉
〈i.2, I(B) → A : X〉
〈i.3, A→ I(B) : {X}kas〉
This association means that the intruder is able to generate any instantiation
of
{|{X}kas |}
i.e.:
{X}kasσ,
if it is able to generate all messages used in the type appearing on the right instan-
tiated by the same substitution σ. Now, since {|X|} is the multiset of messages
used in the sequence of communication steps of this association, then the intruder
is able to generate {X}kasσ, if it can generate Xσ, where σ is a substitution.
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Cup: This rule shows that if τ1 is a type for a multiset M1 and τ2 is a type for a
multiset M2 such that τ1 and τ2 are two compatible types, then τ1 † τ2 is a type
for the union of the two multisets, i.e.M1 ∪M2.
Equiv: Since the merge operator gives us only one possibility to merge two scenar-
ios, the other possibilities can be specified as an equivalence between scenarios.
So, if τ1 is a type for a multiset M and τ2 is a type equivalent to τ1, i.e.τ2 is a
scenario that contains the same communication steps used in τ1 but ordered in a
different way, then τ2 is also a type for the multiset M .
4.4 Correctness Result
The correctness theorem states that if a multiset of messagesM has the type τ under
some static environment ξ (protocol specification), then the type τ is a legitimate
sequence that could be used by the intruder to derive all the messages in M .
Theorem 4.12 (Correctness Theorem) Let M be a multiset of messages and
τ is a type. If ξ ` M : τ , then τ is a ξ-scenario and for all m ∈ M , we have
m ∈ Def(τ)⇓.
4.5 Completeness Result
The intent hereafter is to prove the completeness of the type system.
4.5.1 Definition of Completeness
The soundness property has been introduced as follows: if ξ ` M : τ , then τ
is a ξ-scenario and M ⊆ Def(τ)⇓. Informally, this definition means that τ is a ξ-
scenario and all the messages in M are defined in τ modulo the usual compositions
and decompositions introduced by the operator “⇓”. In other words, the intruder can
generate all the messages in M and the proof is given by the scenario τ . Similarly,
the completeness property could be defined as follows: IfM is a multiset of messages
and τ is a ξ-scenario such that M ⊆ Def(τ)⇓, then ξ ` M : τ .
Our intention hereafter is to refine the definition of completeness without affect-
ing its global meaning. First, let us introduce the following notation:
Definition 4.13 [Minimal ξ-Scenario]
Let ξ be an environment associated with a given protocol, τ a ξ-scenario and M
a multiset of messages. We say that τ is a minimal ξ-scenario for M if the following
conditions hold:
• M ⊆ Def(τ)⇓.
• For all ξ-scenarios τ ′ such that M ⊆ Def(τ ′)⇓ and τ ⊆ τ ′, we have: τ = τ ′.
Intuitively a ξ-scenario τ is not minimal for a multiset of messages M if we
can eliminate some communication steps from τ and the remaining type is also a ξ-
scenario forM . For instance, letM be a multiset of messages and τ a ξ-scenario such
that M ⊆ Def(τ)⇓. By the definition of a ξ-scenario, if τ
′ is another ξ-scenario such
that τ and τ ′ are compatible, then τ † τ ′ is also a ξ-scenario and M ⊆ Def(τ † τ ′)⇓.
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However, the type τ † τ ′ is generally a non minimal ξ-scenario. Let us consider a
concrete example. Let P be the following protocol:
〈α.1 A→B : A〉
We can easily show that 〈α.1 A→I(B) : A〉 is a ξ-scenario for the multiset {|A|}.
We can also prove that:
〈α.1 A→I(B) : A〉
〈β.1 A→I(B) : A〉
is a ξ-scenario for the multiset {|A|}. However, the second ξ-scenario is not minimal.
The definition of completeness is given with respect to a minimal ξ-scenario as
follows:
Definition 4.14 [Definition of Completeness]
Let τ be a ξ-scenario andM a multiset of messages. The type system is complete
if:
τ is a minimal ξ-scenario associated to M =⇒ ξ ` M : τ .
4.5.2 Completeness Theorem
The following theorem shows that the type system is complete with respect to the
completeness definition.
Theorem 4.15 (Completeness) Let ξ be an environment, M a multiset of mes-
sages and τ a ξ-scenario. If τ is a minimal ξ-scenario for M , then ξ ` M : τ .
5 Correctness of Cryptoprotocols
It is a known fact that proving the correctness of security protocols with respect to
a given set of security properties is at least a difficult and a subtle task, if not im-
possible. For that reason, almost all security researchers try to simplify the problem
before its resolution. These simplifications consist generally in studying only one
security property on a restricted class of cryptographic protocols. However, defining
a sub-class of protocols for which their correctness with respect to some security
properties can be verified leads in almost all cases to the definition of a big number
of restrictions reducing considerably their applications in the security field.
Though the type system 3 has been shown sound and complete, verifying whether
a messagem can be known by an intruder or not may lead to an infinite computation.
As a result, the secrecy of the message m may not be assured. The termination
problem is generally related to the deduction strategy (forward chaining, backward
chaining, etc.) used to prove the secrecy of a message m. Unfortunately, backward
chaining and forward chaining may lead to an infinite computation when they are
used to prove the sequent ξ ` m : τ within the type system. For backward chaining
some non-oriented rules such as:
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ξ ` m.m′ : τ
ξ ` m : τ
can lead to a termination problem. Similarly, the presence of some rules such as:
ξ ` m : τ ξ ` m′ : τ ′ τ]τ ′
ξ ` m.m′ : τ † τ ′
can also lead to an infinite computation for forward chaining.
This section introduces some techniques to resolve the termination problem
within inference systems. In particular, these techniques will be combined to the
abstract interpretation ones to resolve the termination problem within the type sys-
tem. Besides, we introduce a modified version of the typing system making easier
the resolution of the termination problem. This modification consists in restricting
the type system so that it will be bound to deal with only a sub-class of security
protocols.
5.1 Outline of the Methodology
The approach used in this paper to ensure the correctness of security protocols with
respect to the secrecy property is essentially based on the resolution of the termi-
nation problem within the type system. Indeed, if there is no termination problem
within the type system, then proving whether a protocol P (M) keeps a message M
secret or not will be always decidable thanks to completeness and correction theo-
rems of the type system. The completeness theorem ensures that a message M is
secret if it is not provable using the typing system. The correction theorem, on the
other hand, ensures that a message M is not secret if it is provable using the type
system.
The basic idea outlining the approach can be summarized as follows:
(i) Resolving the termination problem within a given inference system consists
in generating another equivalent inference system (the two inference systems
have the same induced theory) in which all the rules are ordered by a well-
founded measure 3 . Given a non-terminating inference system, the idea consists
in adding new rules that make redundant (can be removed from the inference
system without affecting the underlying theory) the inference rules that are
the origin of the termination problem. The new generated rules are extracted
from the original inference system and they are by themselves redundant in this
inference system.
(ii) The type system, in its actual form, is indeed not appropriate to be handled
by the termination techniques. Therefore, an abstract function, to simplify the
type system, is defined. This simplification consists essentially in eliminating
from the type system all the information related to the construction of attack
scenarios. Actually, the type system provides the ability to deduce whether a
message M can be hold by a smart intruder. Furthermore, an attack scenario,
3 A partial ordering  over a set T is well-founded if any descending chain t1  t2  . . . of elements in T
is finite.
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exhibiting the sequence of actions executed by an intruder to get possession of
the message M , is constructed. For instance, the rule
2
ξ ` m : τ
states that an intruder can know the message m and the attack scenario is
provided by τ . Since we deal with the correction of a protocol with respect
to the secrecy property, then the information related to the construction of
an attack scenario are no more important. In fact, proving that a message m
can be hold by an intruder, without providing how an attack scenario can be
constructed, is enough to conclude that the protocol does not keep the message
m secret. In the other hand, if the analyzed protocol is secure, then there is, of
course, no attack scenario to generate. In both cases, the information related
to the construction of an attack scenario can be removed without affecting the
conclusion. As a result, the rule
2
ξ ` m : τ
can merely be replaced by
2
ξ ` m.
Another important abstraction consists in replacing the type system by an-
other more general inference system (the theory of the original inference system
is contained in the theory induced by the abstract inference system). For in-
stance, if S1 is an inference system containing the rule R1, then the inference
system S2 = (S1\{R1}) ∪ {R2}, where R2 is a rule obtained from R1 by elimi-
nating some premises, is an abstraction. As a result, if a message m cannot be
proved using S2, then it is also the case when S1 is used. Besides, the inference
system S2 may resolve the termination problem of S1. For instance, let S1 and
S2 be the following inference systems:
S1 = {
2
a ,
x, f(f(x))
f(x)
}
S2 = (S1\{
x, f(f(x))
f(x)
}) ∪ { x
f(x)
}
= {2a ,
x
f(x)
}
Proving f(b) within S1, using backward chaining, leads to an infinite com-
putation. However, within S2, there is no termination problem and it is clear
that f(b) cannot be proved.
Obviously, the soundness of the abstraction process is momentous. In fact,
the soundness property ensures that if the abstract type system proves the
secrecy of a message M within a protocol P (M), then this is indeed correct,
i.e. the original type system gives the same result.
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5.2 Abstract Interpretation and Proof System Termination
Understanding the concept of backward and forward chaining, one generally chooses
backward strategy to prove that a term t is a theorem of a given inference system
S. In fact, unlike forward chaining, backward strategy involves in its proofs only
the sub-goals contributing to the construction of the required proof. Nevertheless,
similarly to forward chaining, backward strategy may lead to an infinite computation
without even solving the problem.
Many efforts have been investigated, last years, in the resolution of the termina-
tion problem within inference systems. Though the termination problem is known
to be in general not decidable, this problem can be resolved for many classes of
inference systems. Proving that there is no termination problem within an inference
system, when using the backward chaining strategy, consists generally in finding
a well-founded ordering relation making the conclusion of each rule less than its
smallest associated premise. Therefore, given a non-terminating inference system
S1, finding another inference system S2 equivalent to S1 so that all the rules of
S2 are ordered by a well-founded relation implies the resolution of the termination
problem of S1.
The intent of the sequel is twofold: First, a new approach to solve the termi-
nation problem within inference systems is introduced. Second, a synergy between
abstract interpretation and termination techniques for the verification of crypto-
graphic protocols with respect to the secrecy property is presented.
5.2.1 Inference System
The purpose hereafter is to address the termination problem at the level of the proof
system.
Preliminaries
Given a set F =
⋃
n≥0Fn of function symbols called a signature and a set
X of variable symbols, the set of terms T (F ,X ) over F and X is the smallest
set containing X such that f(t1, . . . , tn) is in T (F ,X ) whenever f is in Fn and
{t1, . . . , tn} ⊆ T (F ,X ).
An inference rule R over a set of terms T (F ,X ) is defined by a set of premises
{p1, . . . , pn} ⊆ T (F ,X ) and a conclusion c in T (F ,X ) and written as follows:
p1, . . . , pn
c
Besides, an inference rule with an empty set of premises is called an axiom and
written as follows:
2
c
An inference system S over T (F ,X ) is a set of inference rules over T (F ,X ). Let
t be a term in T (F ,X ). We say that t is a theorem in S and we write S ` t, if the
sequent S ` t can be proved using the rules given in Table 4. Intuitively, S ` t if
there exist an inference rule
R =
p1, . . . , pn
c
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in S and a substitution σ such that cσ = t and S ` pi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The
pair (R,σ) is used as a label for the rule
S ` p1σ, . . . , S ` pnσ
S ` cσ
to keep a trace of how the proof of S ` t is constructed.
(R,σ) 2
S ` cσ (R :
2
c ∈ S)
(R,σ)
S ` p1σ, . . . , S ` pnσ
S ` cσ (R :
p1, . . . , pn
c ∈ S)
Table 4
The Inference System Rules
For example, let S be the following inference system:
S = {R1 :
x, y
f(x, y)
, R2 :
2
a ,R3 :
2
b
}
Let σ = [x 7→ a, y 7→ b] and σ′ = ∅. The proof associated with f(a, b) is:
(R1, σ)
(R2, σ
′) 2
S ` a (R3, σ
′) 2
S ` b
S ` f(a, b)
Notices that many proof trees can be associated with the same sequent S ` t.
In the sequel, the set of proof trees associated with the sequent S ` t will be
denoted by [[S ` t]]. If P is a proof tree, then we denote by |P |, the hight of this
tree. Similarly, if R is a rule, then we denote by |R|, the number of the premisses
used in this rule.
The following definition introduces an ordering relation between inference sys-
tems.
Definition 5.1 (Inference System Comparison) Let S1 and S2 be two inference
systems. The ordering relations v and ≡ are defined as follows:
(i) S1 v S2 if ∀ t : S1 ` t⇒ S2 ` t.
(ii) S1 ≡ S2 if S1 v S2 and S2 v S1.
An inference rule is said to be redundant in a given inference system, if it can
be eliminated from this inference system without affecting its involved theory.
Definition 5.2 [Redundant rule] Let S be an inference system. A rule R ∈ S is
said to be redundant in S if:
S ≡ S\{R}.
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Inference System Equivalence
The following proposition gives some examples of trivially redundant rules.
Proposition 5.3 Let S be an inference system and R a rule in S. If one of the
following condition holds:
(i) R =
p1, . . . , pn
c and c ∈ {p1, . . . , pn}.
(ii) R =
p1, . . . , pn
c and there exists a rule R
′ =
p′1, . . . , p
′
n′
c′
in S and a substitu-
tion σ such that:


R 6= R′
c′σ = c
{p′1σ, . . . , p
′
n′σ} ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn}
then rule R is redundant in S.
In what follows, we denote by S↓ the normal form
4 of the inference system S
using the rewriting rules given in Table 5.
Delete: S ∪ {p1, . . . , pnc } ; S if c ∈ {p1 . . . , pn}
Eliminate: S ∪ {p1, . . . , pnc ,
p′1, . . . , p
′
n
c′
} ; S ∪ {
p′1, . . . , p
′
n
c′
} if (*)
(*): ∃ σ| c = c′σ and {p′1σ, . . . , p
′
nσ} ⊆ {p1, . . . , pn}
Table 5
Redundant Rules Elimination
It is straightforward that S↓ exists for any finite system S, since the rewriting
rules decrease the size of S. Furthermore, by the previous proposition, it is imme-
diate that for any inference system S, we have S ≡ S↓.
In what follows, we show how we can introduce new rules in a given inference
system without modifying its induced theory. The idea of adding new inference rules
has been largely used by the rewriting system community to generate a well-ordered
rewriting rule for a finite set of equations. The most famous application of this idea
is the Knuth-Bendix completion algorithm [21]. For more details about rewriting
systems, the reader can refer to [20].
The new rules to be introduced are generated by composing the existing rules
according to the following definition of composition.
4 A term t is said to be in a normal form in a given rewriting system, if it cannot be rewritten by any rule
of this system.
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Definition 5.4 [Rules Composition] Let R =
p1, . . . , pn
c and R1, . . . , Rn a se-
quence of n rules such that Ri =
p1i, . . . , pnii
ci ,1 ≤ i ≤ n. We define the composition
of R1, . . . , Rn with R, denoted by
R1, . . . , Rn
R , as follows:
R1, . . . , Rn
R
=

{
p11σ, . . . , p1n1σ, . . . , p1nσ, . . . , pnnnσ
cσ } if σ exists.
∅ otherwise
where σ = mgu({p1 = c1, . . . , pn = cn}).
The mgu({p1 = c1, . . . , pn = cn}) is the most general unifier, i.e. the most general
substitution that unify all the pairs (p1, c1), . . . , (pn, cn).
Example 5.5 Let S be the following inference system:
S = {R1 :
ff(x1), x1
f(x1)
, R2 :
x2
fff(x2)
, R3 :
2
f(b)
.}
Since mgu({ff(x1) = fff(x2), x1 = f(b)}) = [x1 7→ f(b) x2 7→ b], therefore:
R2, R3
R1
= b
ff(b)
.
The composition of rules will be extended to inference systems as follows: Let R
be a rule such that |R| = n and S an inference system. The composition of S with
R, denoted by SR , is defined as follows:
S
R =
⋃
(R1, ..., Rn)∈Sn
R1, . . . , Rn
R .
Let S1 and S2 be two inference systems. The composition of S1 with S2, denoted
by S1S2
, is defined as follows:
S1
S2
=
⋃
R∈S2
S1
R .
The following proposition states that the addition to a given inference system of
new rules induced by internal compositions does not change its underlying theory.
Proposition 5.6 Let S1, S2 be two sets of rules. We have the following result:
(S1 ∪ S2) ≡ (S1 ∪ S2 ∪
S1
S2
).
Obviously, introducing new rules in an inference system does not solve the termi-
nation problem. We need, indeed, to eliminate from this inference system the rules
causing the termination problem. In this respect, the aim of introducing new rules
is to make redundant the ones causing the termination problem.
The basic result of this section is given by the following theorem which aims
to eliminate some non-trivial redundant rules from an inference system. As shown
84
later, the result of this theorem can be used to give a transformation schema allowing
the resolution of the termination problem within some inference systems.
Theorem 5.7 Let S = S1 ∪ S2 be an inference system such that all the axioms of
S are in S2. If (S1 ∪ S2 ∪
S2
S1
)↓ = S1 ∪ S2, then S ≡ S2.
Handling Termination
In the sequel we introduce an efficient transformation schema which can lead to
avoiding the termination problem within an inference system. The transformation
schema is based on the previously established results related to an inference system.
Let S be an inference system and ≺ a partial order over the terms in T (F ,X ).
We define the inference system S≺ as follows:
S≺ = {
2
c ∈ S}
∪
{p1, . . . , pnc ∈ S | ∀ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : pi ≺ c}.
Also, we introduce the function φ≺(S) as follows:
φ≺(S) = (S ∪
S≺
S\S≺
)↓.
The following corollary gives some important properties of the function φ.
Corollary 5.8 Let S be an inference system and ≺ a partial ordering over the
terms in T (F ,X ). We have:


(i) φ≺(S) ≡ S.
(ii) if φ≺(S) = S then S ≡ S≺.
Let ≺ be a well-founded ordering. Thanks to the previous corollary, we can give
a transformation schema that can solve the termination problem within an inference
system. This transformation schema states that if S has a normal form using the
rewriting rules given in Table 6, then this normal form is an inference system with
no termination problem.
Simplify: S ; S≺ if S = φ≺(S)
Compose: S ; φ≺(S)
Table 6
The Termination Schema
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5.2.2 Abstract Type System
The intent hereafter is to abstract the type system so that it can be easily analyzed
using the termination techniques. This abstraction consists in eliminating all the
information used to construct a scenario whenever an attack is found. More formally,
the function that allows to abstract a type system is denoted by Υ and defined as
follows:
Υ(∅) = ∅
Υ({2c } ∪ S
′) = { 2
Υp(c)
} ∪Υ(S′)
Υ({p1, . . . , pnc } ∪ S
′) = {
Υp(p1), . . . ,Υp(pn)
Υp(c)
} ∪Υ(S′)
where Υp is a function abstracting a premise or a conclusion of a type system rule
as follows:
Υp(τ1]τ2) = 2
Υp(τ1 ≈ τ2) = 2
Υp(M1 ⊆M2) = M1 ⊆M2
Υp(ξ `M : τ) = Υe(ξ) `M
The abstraction of a premise into “2” means its elimination from the abstracted rule.
Finally, the function Υe is used to abstract an environment ξ into ξ
[ as follows:
Υe(∅) = ∅
Υe({[M 7→ τ ]} ∪ ξ) = {[M 7→ Use(τ)]} ∪Υe(ξ)
The abstract type system is given in Table 7. The following theorem states that this
abstraction is correct.
Theorem 5.9 (Abstraction Soundness) Let ξ and ξ[ be two environments such
that ξ[ = Υe(ξ). Also, let M be a multiset of messages and τ a ξ-scenario:
If ξ ` M : τ then ξ[ `[ M
Though the abstract type system is simpler than the concrete one, it is not yet
suitable to be handled by the termination. For that reason, a new version of the
abstract type system is introduced as follows: Let Tξ[ be the abstract type system
associated with ξ[. We denote by Sξ[ , the smallest inference system satisfying the
conditions given in Table 8.
Notice that the rules of the simplified abstract type system can be modified when
necessary to fit the requirement of the analyzed protocol. For instance, the symmet-
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(Triv)[ 2
ξ[ `[ {||}
(Op1)[
ξ[ `[ {|m|} ξ[ `[ {|m′|}
ξ[ `[ {|m op m′|}
(Op2)[
ξ[ `[ {|m|} ξ[ `[ {|m op m′|}
ξ[ `[ {|m′|}
(Op3)[
ξ[ `[ {|m′|} ξ[ `[ {|m op m′|}
ξ[ `[ {|m|}
(Comp)[
ξ[ `[ {|m|} ξ[ `[ {|m′|}
ξ[ `[ {|m.m′|}
(Dec1)[
ξ[ `[ {|m.m′|}
ξ[ `[ {|m|}
(Dec2)[
ξ[ `[ {|m.m′|}
ξ[ `[ {|m′|}
(Encr)[
ξ[ `[ {|m|} ξ[ `[ {|k|}
ξ[ `[ {|{m}k|}
(Decr)[
ξ[ `[ {|{m}k|} ξ
[ `[ {|k|}
ξ[ `[ {|m|}
(Inst)[
ξ[ † [M 7→M ′] `[ M ′σ M1 ⊆M ′σ
ξ[ † [M 7→M ′] `[ M1
(Cup)[
ξ[ `[ M1 ξ
[ `[ M2
ξ[ `[ M1 ∪M2
Table 7
The Abstract Type System
ric key encryption and decryption rules given in the type system can be replaced by
public key encryption and decryption rules if the analyzed protocol uses public keys.
Besides, the rules dealing with operators can be eliminated if the protocol does not
use arithmetic operations (m1 op m2, where op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /}).
The following proposition proves that the system Sξ[ is equivalent to Tξ[ .
Proposition 5.10 Let ξ be an environment associated with a given protocol and ξ[
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m1 m2
{m1}m2
∈ Sξ[
{m1}m2 m2
m1
∈ Sξ[


M 7→ {|m′1, . . . ,m
′
n′ |} ∈ ξ
[
and
m ∈M
⇒
m′1 . . . m
′
n′
m ∈ Sξ[
m1 m2
m1,m2 ∈ Sξ[
m1,m2
m1 ∈ Sξ[
m1,m2
m2 ∈ Sξ[
m1 m2
m1 op m2 ∈ Sξ[
m1 op m2 m1
m2 ∈ Sξ[
m1 op m2 m2
m1 ∈ Sξ[
Table 8
The Simplified Abstract Type System
its abstracted version. We have:
ξ[ `[ {|m|} if and only if Sξ[ ` m.
5.2.3 Case Study
The aims hereafter is to use the abstract interpretation and the termination results to
prove the correction of some security protocols with respect to the secrecy property.
Protocol
The analyzed protocol is inspired by the symmetric key Needham-Schroeder
protocol (the first three steps of a corrected version of the Needham-Schroeder sym-
metric key protocol):
〈α.1 A→S : A,B,Nαa 〉
〈α.2 S→A : {Nαa , B, k
α
ab, {k
α
ab, N
α
a , A}kbs}kas〉
〈α.3 A→B : {kαab, N
α
a , A}kbs〉
This protocol aims to establish a new key between two principals A and B. This
key will be used by A and B for their future communication and should be kept
secret.
The generalized roles associated with this protocol are as follows:
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A1 = 〈α.1 A→ I(S) : A,B,Nαa 〉
A2 = 〈α.1 A→ I(S) : A,B,Nαa 〉
〈α.2 I(S)→A : {Nαa , B,X, Y }kas〉
〈α.3 A→I(B) : Y 〉
S = 〈α.1 I(A)→ S : A,B,X〉
〈α.2 S→I(A) : {X,B, kαab, {k
α
ab,X,A}kbs}kas〉
The environment associated with this protocol is given in Table 9.
ξ = {
KI 7→ 
{|A.B.Nαa |} 7→ A
1
{|Y |} 7→ A2
{|{X,B, kαab, {k
α
ab,X,A}kbs}kas |} 7→ S
}
Table 9
The Needham-Schroeder Protocol Environment
Protocol Abstract Type System
Since the protocol uses symmetric keys and since it does not use arithmetic
operations, the simplified representation of the abstract type system will be as shown
in Table 10. This type system is generated according to the rules presented in Table
8 and supposes that the intruder’s initial knowledge contains A and kis. This means
that the intruder i knows all the other principal identities (A is a variable that can
be replaced by any principal identifier) and it shares a key kis with the server S.
The rules R1 and R2 reflect the intruder initial knowledge. They are indeed
extracted from the following mapping:
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R1 :
2
A R2 :
2
kis
R3 :
2
A,B,Nαa
R7 :
x, y
x R8 :
x, y
y
R4 :
x y
x, y R5 :
x y
{x}y
R9 :
{x}y y
x
R6 :
A,B, x
{x,B, kαab, {k
α
ab, x,A}kbs}kas
R10 :
{Nαa , B, x, y}kas
y
Table 10
The Needham-Schroeder Abstract Type System
KI 7→ .
The rule R3 is extracted from the following mapping:
{|A.B.Nαa |} 7→ A
1.
The rule R6 is extracted from the following mapping:
{|{X,B, kαab, {k
α
ab,X,A}kbs}kas |} 7→ S.
The rule R10 is extracted from the following mapping:
{|Y |} 7→ A2.
Finally, the rules R4, R5, R7, R8 and R9 reflect the usual intruder abilities.
Notice that all the rules on the left hand side of Table 10 belong to S≺ (S is the
inference system given in Table 10 and ≺ is defined such that t1 ≺ t2 if |t1| < |t2|).
However, all the rules in the right hand side belong to S\S≺.
Handling Termination
To solve the termination problem within the inference system given in Table
10, we use the transformation schema given in Table 6 and the ordering relation ≺
(t1 ≺ t2 if |t1| < |t2|) as a well-founded measure. Notice also that for the sake of
simplicity, we keep the standard notation used within cryptographic protocols in the
inference rules when using the transformation schema. For instance, the messages A
and B denote principal identity variables. In other words, these messages have to be
treated as variables but their substitutions are bound to principal identities. More
precisely, a message A can be replaced by the term Agt(x) which means that A is a
variable denoting a principal identity. Also, we use Nαa to denote the term N(α,A)
i.e. N(α,Agt(x)), kab to denote the term k(A,B) and k
α
ab to denote k(α,A,B).
Finally, i and s are two constants, where i denotes the intruder identity and s is
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the server identity. To simplify the result of the transformation schema, we suppose
that the message m,m′,m′′ = (m,m′),m′′.
i Si≺ S
i\Si≺ Inference
0
R1 :
2
A R2 :
2
kis
R3 :
2
A,B,Nαa
R4 :
x y
x, y R5 :
x y
{x}y
R6 :
A,B, x
{x,B, kαab, {k
α
ab, x,A}kbs}kas
R7 :
x, y
x R8 :
x, y
y
R9 :
{x}y y
x
R10 :
{Nαa , B, x, y}kas
y
1
The rule of S0≺ and
R3
R8
: 2
B,Nαa
R6
R10
:
A,B,Nαa
{kαab, N
α
a , A}kbs
R6 R2
R9
:
i, B, x
x,B, kαib{k
α
ib, x, i}kbs
The rule of S0\S0≺ and
R5
R10
:
Nαa , B, x, y kas
y
Compose
2
S1≺
R3
R8
R8
: 2
Nαa
R6 R2
R9
R8
:
i, B, x
B, kαib, {k
α
ib, x, i}kbs
(S1\S1≺)
R6 R2
R9
R7
: i, B, xx
Compose
Table 11
Handling Termination: Part I
The application of the transformation schema is shown in Tables 11 and 12,
Table 13 and Table 14. Notice that the rules
i B, x
kαib
and
i, B, x
kαib
of Table 13 are
made redundant by the rule 2
kαib
.
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3S2≺
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
:
i, B, x
kαib, {k
α
ib, x, i}kbs
(S2\S2≺)
R4
R6 R2
R9
R7
:
i B, x
x Compose
Table 12
Handling Termination: Part I - cont’d
Protocol Correction
The result of the transformation schema shows that the abstract type system
associated with the Needham-Schroeder protocol is equivalent to the terminating
inference system given in Table 15.
Notice that all the rules in this inference system are ordered by ≺, i.e. the
premises of each rule are smaller than the conclusion of the same rule with respect
to the ordering relation ≺.
Since the termination problem is resolved, proving whether a message m can
be inferred using the terminating inference system given in Table 15 is decidable.
For instance, let a1 and a2 be two principal identities. It is clear, that the message
kαa1a2 can not be inferred from the terminating inference system. Therefore, thanks
to the soundness of the abstraction and the transformation schema, we deduce that
the three communication steps inspired by the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key
protocol keeps the new generated key secret. As a result, we conclude that the
secrecy property is satisfied.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have combined different formal and elegant techniques to ensure
the correctness of security protocols with respect to the secrecy property. Type
system, abstract interpretation and proof system termination are the basic ones
used to reach this goal. In fact, the approach is based on a sound and complete type
system in which types are communication steps and typing constraints characterize
all the messages available to the intruder. This reduces verification of authentication
and secrecy properties to a typing problem in our type system. Furthermore, a
transformation schema that can resolve the termination problem within inference
systems. Also, we have introduced a sound abstraction for the type system. This
abstraction aims to simplify the typing rules so that they can be easily handled by
the transformation schema. Once the termination problem of the type system is
resolved, the correctness of a security protocol with respect to the secrecy property
can be easily analyzed. The efficiency of this approach has been illustrated on a
concrete example.
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i Si≺ S
i\Si≺ Inference
4
S3≺
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
:
i, B, x
{kαib, x, i}kbs
(S3\S3≺)
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R7
:
i, B, x
kαib
Compose
5
S4≺
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
R2
R9
:
i, B, x
kαii, x, i
(S4\S4≺)
R4
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R7
:
i B, x
kαib Compose
6
S5≺
R1
R3
R8
R4
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R7
: 2
kαib
(S5\S5≺)\{
i B, x
kαib
,
i, B, x
kαib
}
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
R2
R9
R9
:
i, B, x
x, i
Compose
7
S6≺
(S6\S6≺)
R4
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
R2
R9
R9
:
i B, x
x, i
Compose
Table 13
Handling Termination: Part II
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i Si≺ S
i\Si≺ Inference
8
S7≺
R1
R3
R8
R4
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
R2
R9
R9
:
Nαa , i
R1 R4
R4
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
R2
R9
R9
: B xx, i
R1
R6 R2
R9
R8
R4
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
R2
R9
R9
:
i, B, x
kαib, {k
α
ib, x, i}kbs , i
(S7\S7≺)
Compose
9
S8≺
R1
R6 R2
R9
R8
R4
R6 R2
R9
R8
R8
R8
R2
R9
R9
R8
:
i, B, x
{kαib, x, i}kbs , i
(S8\S8≺)
Compose
10
S9≺ (S
9\S9≺)
Compose
11
S10≺ ∅
Simplify
Table 14
Handling Termination: Part III
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2A
2
kis
2
kαib
2
Nαa
2
A,B,Nαa
2
Nαa , i
2
B,Nαa
x y
x, y
x y
{x}y
B x
x, i
i, B, x
kαii, x, i
i, B, x
{kαib, x, i}kbs
A,B,Nαa
{kαab, N
α
a , A}kbs
i, B, x
kαib, {k
α
ib, x, i}kbs , i
i, B, x
B, kαib, {k
α
ib, x, i}kbs
i, B, x
kαib, {k
α
ib, x, i}kbs
A,B, x
{x,B, kαab, {k
α
ab, x,A}kbs}kas
i, B, x
x,B, kαib{k
α
ib, x, i}kbs
Table 15
Terminating Abstract System
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